

WHAT KIND OF WORLD DO WE LIVE IN?

An address to

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by

Ivan L. Head

The present can seldom be understood without reference to the past; in some instances the recent past, in others a more distant past. The task of the policy maker remains, however, that of distinguishing those current events which bear similarity to earlier activity and those that are quite without precedent. It is not an easy choice.

The 13th Century is one of those few in history that was both an interlude and a vigorous, active turning point. It followed on the conclusion of the Dark Ages, but preceded the Renaissance. It was the century of the Crusades, when European rulers sought to extend the geographic domain of Christendom but failed and, in doing so, brought about the demise of feudalism. It was a period which coincidentally encouraged the flowering of chivalry and introduced barbaric torture as an instrument of legal process - the inquisition. Such monuments as Magna Carta, the Cologne Cathedral, the papacy, the great universities, the structure of international commerce and banking all found flourishing root

during the 1200s. Kublai Khan became Governor of China; Dante, St. Francis of Assisi and St. Thomas Aquinas illuminated the era. Religious inspiration was a mighty force. So was religious intolerance. It distorted attitudes toward Islam even as Christian Europeans benefitted in their daily lives from the much superior Moslem science and technology.

Turbulence, confusion and change marked the 13th Century; barbarity was present, as was the promise of civilization. In the midst of the period, Alfonso the Great observed wryly "Had I been present at the creation, I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe."

Seven hundred and fifty years following the death of Genghis Khan, the 20th Century offers, if anything, even greater evidence of turbulence, confusion and change. Extraordinary scientific discoveries occur simultaneously with savage human conduct. Unprecedented military activity has proved in some instances to be wise and productive, in others to be ill-chosen and destructive of the democratic process it often seeks to defend. Economic imbalance poses challenges of immense proportion. Opportunity and entrapment are often disguised. The confusion thus created contributes sometimes to adventurism, sometimes to the fatalistic assumption that the human chronicle is an unalterable continuum.

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The 13th Century should serve as a reminder to us that at some periods, circumstance combines both intense peril and the ingredients for extraordinary accomplishment. We live in such a time.

In one fundamental respect, the 20th Century breaks from the past even more distinctly than did the 13th. Mankind faces now the realization that in several major sectors its condition is terminal, that errors committed now may be irreversible. Never before has peril been so irremedial.

- The biosphere on which we all depend for our life-support systems is not able, indefinitely, to maintain a natural equilibrium countering the continued release into the oceans and atmosphere of immense quantities of poisonous effluents.

- The explosive force of modern nuclear weaponry is so destructive, and the consequences of its use so permanent and far-reaching, that any consideration of its application must include, perforce, the contemplation of global holocaust.

- The natural supply of non-renewable resources on which our industrial complexes depend in order to function may in certain instances be approaching exhaustion.

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In some circumstances these sectors interlink and contribute in compound fashion to the peril. One example is found in the quantities of oil now released into the oceans either purposely or negligently: more than one million tons of this non-renewable and precious resource each year poison the wholesomeness of our seas and beaches. (If off-shore blow-outs of the kind now raging in the Gulf of Mexico become more commonplace, this figure will quickly balloon.)

Twentieth-century policy-makers must not lose sight of these absolutes in their quest for solution of the problems before them. It is a novel circumstance that such constraints limit the exercise of power of all states; they are constraints that are indifferent to size, indifferent to might. In the result there is now in progress a degree of levelling unprecedented in earlier times.

No longer can the very powerful be confident of their military, economic or political invulnerability. The interrelationship of issues which were once capable of exclusive management, and the present economic interdependence of nations both large and small, permit nations of a variety of sizes to act with influence and effect. That fact has introduced into the international community an unpredictable element. No longer do we live in the age of the major, middle and lesser power. Ours is the age of the "effective" power. In it, responsibility for the human condition lies with each state in the international community.

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II

Events and conditions cascade upon us. Canadians find themselves today in a world far different from that of even 20 years ago. Then, the United Nations consisted of 83 member states. Today, the number is 149. With the important exceptions of Zimbabwe and Namibia, the colonial era has virtually concluded. In one of the most extraordinary periods in the history of the world, hundreds of millions of persons have passed from a colonial status to one of political self-rule. The transition in some instances has been the forerunner of political stability. Often it has not. And seldom has independence brought with it the economic buoyancy required to satisfy rising expectations of social well-being.

In that same period of 20 years the spectre of communism, and in some instances the reality of communist aggression, solidified the previous division of the world into political blocs - Warsaw Pact and NATO. Those adhering to neither bloc, though in some instances intimately connected with one or the other, in most instances called themselves the non-aligned. From a charter membership of 25 in 1961, that group has expanded to its present strength of 89. It is meeting at this minute in Havana.

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Contemporaneous with this sequence of political revolution and evolution has been another revolution, one which in terms of impact is perhaps of greater scope than any since 1300. This revolution is scientific and technological in nature. It has made obsolete previous concepts of transportation and communication; it has influenced in overwhelming fashion the design and disposition of weapons systems; it has made possible undreamed of increases in agricultural productivity; it has contributed to the reorganization of human endeavour with solid state electronic components and micro-processing techniques. It has done little, however, to remedy the imbalance between rich and poor nations.

The combination of these influences and events has created the world of 1979 - a world of unprecedented expectations, of explosive increases in population, of political competition and economic disparity, of ecological deterioration and military threat. In time-frames now measured in micro-seconds, situations demand rapid analysis and response. We can only envy the luxury of contemplation which accrues to historians as an element of their profession, permitting them long after the event to determine what was cause and what was effect. Those of us coping with the kaleidoscopic flood of human experience which is the present have no time to sort one from the other; we must take decisions now, and must do so often on the basis of inadequate evidence, conditioned always by past influences. Is the Soviet presence in Southern Africa the cause of racial

agitation there, or has the failure to eliminate minority regimes caused the majority to turn to communist support? Has better nutrition and increased health care launched an irreversible increase in population, or will birth rates begin to drop dramatically as parents gain in confidence that their children will survive into adulthood? Historians in due course will tell us which is the answer in each case. In the meantime, governments must act on the assumption they know the correct response.

Technology has produced no substitute for reasoned judgement. What it does provide, and often in prodigious quantities, is information. It is this that must be organized, analyzed, assessed, employed. One collector system is dependent upon earth-orbiting satellites. In the period that we will be gathered here this morning, such a satellite could have made three passes over Kingston. What is the imagery that it and the many others are assembling?

III

One task assigned to satellites is the monitoring of the nuclear forces of each of the United States and the Soviet Union, a vital element in the relationship between the two states. Each of these countries in 1979 continues to play a dominant role as a global military actor. Each is possessed of an arsenal of strategic weaponry but neither is confident it possesses a scenario for its effective employment. (The terminology of strategy reflects the innovations in technology. Second strike capability has given way to counterforce proposals which in turn have been blurred by the vision of MAD - mutual assured destruction.)

Cautiously, with agonizing slowness, the two powers have agreed to deny to themselves certain spatial, sectoral and quantitative options. SALT I has proceeded to SALT II. The Outer Space Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Seabed Treaty, the Environment Protocol are all in place. Management of the armament relationship occupies much time and energy in each of the two countries. The key ingredient of trust remains elusive, however, sometimes in the negotiating forum as at SALT, CCD or MBFR, sometimes in the domestic arena as now, in the United States Senate.

Each of these nuclear giants is well aware of the awesome destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. Each is cognizant of the danger of accidental war (they have implemented bilateral undertakings to reduce the risk), and each is aware of the uncertainty surrounding any scenario of nuclear weapons application. No theatre commander in the history of warfare has ever come under attack by nuclear weapons; no prediction of the scale and effect of response and counter-response can be accepted unquestionably. In the result the superpower nuclear balance is a matter of continuing study, discussion, management. It promises some degree of stability. Not so the issue of proliferation.

The latter threat stems from the unpredictability associated with the Nth state and its lack of experience with nuclear options. And here the only international instrument in place - the Non-Proliferation Treaty - is regarded with suspicion and disdain by many proud nations

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because of the establishment within it of discriminatory principles. As technological competence increases, the attitudes and policies of some of the non-adherents to the NPT become increasingly important. The current tension and nuclear-intention uncertainty in each of India and Pakistan are examples of the problem; that tension in turn is enhanced by the common border each country shares with the Peoples Republic of China, itself possessed of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and still feeling its way onto an unfamiliar world stage.

Among many of the developing countries there exists a strong belief that the industrialized states will endeavour to maintain their economic superiority through the systematic and selective denial of essential technology. One of the most vital elements in the industrialization process is energy, and one of the increasingly attractive sources of non-conventional energy is the nuclear mode. The mere suggestion, therefore, of stringent safeguards or other precautions against the diversion of the nuclear process into weaponry arouses protests and accusations that dependency is the motivating factor. And so long as nuclear arms control and disarmament is the sluggish and circuitous exercise that it has become once again, then will there continue to be presented the inelegant but provocative analogy of 'vertical' and 'horizontal' proliferation.

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Much is demanded of the exercises now underway at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the London Nuclear Suppliers Club, and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. Much work is needed as well to demonstrate to acquisitive states the inherently destabilizing effect of primitive nuclear devices and their consequent failure as a deterrent.

In short, the world cannot assume, without the dedication of increased resources on a number of fronts, that the nuclear weapons hazard will diminish. Indeed, one of the unanticipated and certainly undesirable consequences of SALT II may be an increase in nuclear weapons acquisition. The lesson will not be lost on the Nth states.

IV

Susceptible as well to satellite imagery, but far less disciplined than are the preparations for a nuclear test, are the instances of use of conventional weapons. These are many and are globally hazardous whether the exchanges are within borders or across them. This is so because the communicability of conflict, and the constraints to its containment, make civil war as dangerous a threat to world stability as is international hostility. One of the vectors of its transmission is the rationale of the liberation movement, which makes ever more diffuse the distinction between internal and international.

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In this summer of 1979 conflict rages across boundaries in the Middle East, in Southern Africa and in Indo-China. Armed struggles flicker and flare in Iran, in Ethiopia, in Chad, in Afghanistan, in Ulster, in the Spanish Sahara and, until recent days, in Nicaragua. The ingredients for revolt exist wherever temptation and complaint intersect. There is no reason to expect that the incidence of intersection will decrease in the future.

The ability of the international community to bring to bear some measure of standard analysis and some sense of the balance between justice and orderliness will determine the rate of infectiousness as well as the rate of success in resolving the issues underlying these conflicts. Not all actors, of course, measure either justice or orderliness in comparable fashion. Not all rate equally highly the value of a political environment free from military tension. Not all accept the tenets of community in a regional, let alone a planetary, sense. This fact makes more difficult the design of any Canadian response to conflict elsewhere.

Canada is some distance geographically from each of these hot spots yet our history teaches us that remoteness is no barrier to involvement. More than 50 years have passed since Senator Dandurand informed the Assembly of the League of Nations that Canadians "live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammatory materials." Yet on numerous

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occasions, for various reasons, Canadian governments have found it to be in the national interest to become involved in seemingly far away turbulence. In recent years this involvement has most often taken the form of some collective activity under the aegis of the United Nations or of NATO. Yet because of their good fortune to be residents of a country which shares a boundary with only a single state, and that the most stable of democracies, Canadians continue to regard with complacency their tranquil neighborhood in a turbulent world. Not in Canada was much concern expressed at the possible spread of fuel shortages in either 1973 or 1979. Not here is there much sense of the vulnerability of our national fabric to political, economic or social events elsewhere. The indifference contributes to the peril.

A good number of the conflicts are modern reflections of long-enduring complaints. Some, like the regional tensions in Iran, or the religious animosities in Ulster, are centuries old; some in Africa and Asia rest on tribal and ethnic origins; others as in Afghanistan or in the Middle East are rooted in much more recent political activity.

Still another cockpit of conflict threatens world stability. As the colonial powers withdraw from the tiniest and economically least viable of their former empires, the phenomenon of the micro-state has emerged, and with it a new quality of vulnerability. In the Caribbean, in the South Pacific and in the Indian Ocean there exist tiny island

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communities in varying stages of political independence, few of them capable of repelling an onslaught by even a dozen or two well armed and determined attackers. The possibility of occurence of such a phenomenon passed from the theoretical to the actual a few months ago in Grenada. The source of such attack could be internal or external; the chances of repelling one under present circumstances varies from unlikely to impossible. Equally unattractive is the prospect of adequately preparing the governmental authorities to permit them to withstand incidents of this nature. To do so would be to change to their detriment the informal social structures now existing. Perhaps the only effective deterrent would be, as in the past, the existence of superior external forces available for transport to the scene. In the post-colonial world, these could only be of an international character. In the age of non-intervention, the creation of a rationale for the employment of such a force is an intimidating prospect. The need for some solution to the problem is now being examined urgently by some of the states which are potential victims.

V

Conflict springs forth from a variety of courses, most of them indiscernible to satellite surveillance. National or ethnic pride, religious militancy, and minority mistreatment have all repeated themselves as factors, but the single most frequent element in disputes is economic in nature. It was economic motivation that led to all of the colonial

wars, to the assaults on each of China and Japan in the 19th Century, and to the lengthy trade wars between the maritime powers of Western Europe. Economic factors contributed as well primarily and directly to World War II, in the view of Sir Winston Churchill.

In 1979, economic issues dominate the international scene. Their potential as the cause of conflict cannot be disregarded. Of more immediate importance, the continuance of these issues contributes to the discontent and malaise now so prevalent in the world.

Succeeding sessions of the Economic Summit have addressed a range of issues economic in nature; a series of economic conferences has focussed on one or another sector - the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (just concluded in Geneva following several years of intensive sessions), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (the 5th session of which took place in Manila last year), the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (in Paris in 1977). A heavy proportion of these discussions concentrates on the north-south dimension of economic activity. They do so because more and more there is acknowledgement that the world's economy is not working well for anyone, and that it will not improve for anyone unless it improves for all. For this to happen, a considerable rise in the performance of the developing countries will be necessary.

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Several means to this end are now being pursued; some have exhibited more success than have others. If one sets aside for a moment the more classical forms of development assistance, a technique to bolster economic performance now attracting increasing attention is that of common market creation. Such entities assume several forms. The Caribbean countries chose to create first a free-trade area (CARIFTA) which later matured into a common market (CARICOM). Twenty-four Latin American and Caribbean countries have been experimenting with something called SELA, an economic system embodying certain common elements. The Andean Pact, of Bolivia, Colombia, Equador, Peru and Venezuela has launched a number of studies and projects which draw upon and seek to benefit factors present in each of the member countries. The French-speaking countries in West Africa belong to a monetary union and rely upon a single unit of currency. They, with others, have formed the Economic Community of West African States. The very ambitious Association of South East Asian Nations has a firm economic as well as political base. So does the Council of Arab Economic Unity. Some geographic groupings have negotiated special arrangements with the European Community, of which the Lomé Convention is the pioneer and best known. Movements of economic union among developing countries are afoot elsewhere. Not deterred by the difficulties or the spectacular failures such as the East African Community, these efforts persist. One now being given active consideration is in the South Pacific, extending from Samoa to New Zealand, as a more cohesive and structured development of the current South Pacific Commission.

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Each of these initiatives is designed in one way or another to overcome the problems associated with smallness and to gain the benefits of market units of greater scale. It is a problem familiar to successive generations of Canadians.

Canada is the only major industrialized country (as measured by membership in the Economic Summit) which does not have access for its goods to a protected market of more than 100 million persons. (Japan and the United States both enjoy domestic markets larger than that figure; Britain, France, Germany and Italy are all members of the European Community with a total population of 259 million.)

Largely as a result of scale, Canadian dependence upon international trade is striking. 24.5% of the Gross National Product is derived from the sale abroad of Canadian goods and services. The comparable United States figure is 10%. Fully one half of all Canadian manufacturing jobs are dependent upon exports. The U.S. figure - 1/6th. And no less than 55% of all our agricultural acreage is dedicated to foreign markets as compared to 33-1/3% in the United States.

The Canadian economy is inextricably part of an international system, and is dependent for its health upon the well-being of that system. An ever-growing part of that system is the group of developing countries. Examples abound according to World Bank statistics: 43% of all Japanese

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merchandise exports are sold in the developing countries. 37% of U.S. merchandise exports go to the same markets. LDC imports of merchandise from the industrialized countries in the 1970s has grown at a pace more than 50% faster than merchandise trade among the industrialized countries. And in 1976 the industrialized countries enjoyed a favourable balance of trade with the LDCs of some $70 billion.

It appears self-evident, therefore, that economic opportunity for the industrialized countries rests in large measure with growth in the LDCs. President Carter stated recently: "Only by acting together (with the developing countries) can we expand trade and investment in order to create more jobs, to curb inflation, and to raise the standard of living of our peoples.

"The industrial nations ... cannot by themselves bring about world economic recovery. Strong growth and expansion in the developing countries are essential ...

"For the rest of this century, the greatest potential for growth is in the developing world."

Growth in the developing countries means in large measure healthy, well-fed, educated people. Yet in country after country the opposite is more often the norm. Almost one half of the 2 billion persons

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in those countries exist on annual incomes of U.S.$300. or less. Developing country governments are acutely aware of the conditions of their own people and of the disparity in living standards between them and the residents of the industrialized states. That awareness is contributing to a tension in the world climate which portends considerable difficulty in the future. Former German Chancellor Willy Brandt said in New York last winter that relations between the industrialized and the developing countries "constitutes the most important social problem for the rest of the century."

Robert McNamara wrote last spring: "... unless there is visible progress towards a solution (of LDC poverty) we shall not have a peaceful world. We cannot build a secure world upon a foundation of human misery."

VI

In what order of priority does one place these issues of nuclear proliferation, of outbreaks of belligerency, of crises both economic and political? How do democratically-elected governments find time to assign priorities when assailed from all sides by questions of urgency? Sir Winston Churchill once offered a superb non response to such a question. "History", he said, "is just one damn thing after another."

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Energy and environment are two such. Each has roots. The unprecedented industrial growth of the 50s and 60s was partly a product of the availability of low-cost oil; this, in turn, permitted and demanded some progress in combatting environmental pollution. Then came both oil embargoes and huge price increases. These led quickly to a peculiar combination of economic recession and faltering recovery, of inflation, unemployment, still higher oil prices, shifts in other commodity prices, balance of payments disequilibrium, and exchange rate fluctuations. Environmental concerns decreased and policy conflicts began to emerge between growth and conservation. They continue unabated today and all too often leave the observer with the impression that growth and conservation are mutually exclusive alternatives. That is not the case.

In Canada, in the period to 1990, a reduction in the annual rate of growth of energy consumption from 4% (as now projected) to 2% would save, it has been calculated, a volume of energy equivalent to the output of six Syncrude plants, plus 80% of the expected annual Canadian output of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline, plus fifteen Pickering-size nuclear plants, plus 10 million tons of bituminous coal. Waste and growth are not synonomous, even though they often appear indistinguishable in statistical tables; conservation and growth can be mutually supportive.

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Energy is a multi-faceted piece in the economic matrix. Historically, its supply side has attracted considerably more attention than has pricing. By the time of the 21st Century, however, with the likely serious depletion of fossil fuel reserves, supply will again be the key component unless alternative sources are established. Today, however, price is the compelling element.

Price increases have stimulated inflation and recession in the industrialized countries. In the developing countries, many of which are totally dependent upon oil imports as a source of commercial energy and of oil-derived products such as fertilizer, price rises have dealt a crippling blow. In many places strains are evident in the social and political structures. In the United States, violent conduct in gasoline lines. In Canada, different but possibly more profound events.

The current spread between the domestic crude price at Toronto - $15.25 per barrel - and the imported price at Montreal - $25.00 - has created turbulent forces now gathering strength. Symptomatic of them are the tensions resulting from the immense and rapid inter-provincial transfers of real resources. The impact of this phenomenon upon the Canadian federal structure has yet to be revealed to Canadians in all of its dimensions.

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References to energy appear again and again in this or any other canvas of the world scene - as an aspect of environmental degradation, as a factor in the nuclear proliferation puzzle, as an element in international economics, as a fibre in the social fabric. Energy issues, clearly, are not severable. Nor, I suggest, are they susceptible of solution within Canada or without absent equitable and representative legal regimes. In this respect they are no different from the other subjects I have mentioned this morning.

But the regimes are painfully slow in their evolution. Notwithstanding adequate evidence that the world is not functioning well, notwithstanding persuasive arguments that new cooperative mechanisms are needed, even such obvious instances as a comprehensive law of the sea remains incomplete. As one result, Canadian law enforcement agents are now arresting off the Pacific coast fishing boats of United States registry as they arrested four years ago off the Atlantic coast fishing vessels of Soviet registry.

The international community last month once again found it not possible to conclude negotiations aimed at a global maritime regime. Some further progress was made but there is still danger of foundering. This, even though states, both coastal and land-locked, now agree that the sea encompasses resources and activities which have economic, environmental, political and military implications. They agree as well

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in principle that the sea must no longer be viewed as a limitless resource, self-renewing and incapable of exhaustion, open to those with the power to employ it but denied in certain instances to others because of, as one example, their lack of littoral qualifications.

And as the states agree, so have they come to recognize and accept that a state's interests in the waters off its coasts are not always territorially co-extensive and do not therefore require protection of a uniform nature. Territorial limits have for some years been distinct in breadth from fisheries zones. Different protective techniques are employed for different fish stocks with some species, such as salmon, demanding peculiar arrangements. Particular waters, because of traffic or climatic or physical hazards, require particular regulatory mechanisms.

Gradually gathering way is an awareness of the global role of the oceans and of their critical contribution as an element in the planetary biosphere. Military and transportation applications notwithstanding, the absolute requirements of the human race for a functioning physical environment and for equitable and efficient exploitation of resources both living and non-living in the oceans and ocean floor, are now dictating the priorities of policy formulation and application. The reasoning of Grotius and Vattel is in large measure no longer applicable: their assertion that the sea cannot be reduced to possession because of

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its liquid nature and its indefinable limits has been invalidated by scientists who have devised techniques of planting permanent detection and destructive devices in the seabed; their contention that the resources of the sea are so inexhaustible that no injury can be done to them either through navigation or fishing now echoes hollowly as some fish species have been eliminated through greed, and as large tracts of ocean have been fouled beyond recovery through irresponsible acts of the masters and owners of large vessels.

Yet as modern technology has overtaken the understanding of these jurisprudential giants, their devotion to the concept of an international community and to a body of law to regulate the conduct of its members is of greater importance today than it was in their lifetimes. The nature of that community has changed perceptibly and the number of its members has increased immensely, but the need for cooperation and orderly conduct has never been greater. In 1979 the possessory theories of Bynkershoek are as outmoded as the 17th century cannon whose range gave rise to the original breadth of the territorial sea. Equally outmoded are some of the other concepts that still play such an influential role in the activities of mankind.

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VII

Any snapshot of the world scene, and certainly the one we are sharing this morning, becomes quickly dated. Whether or not affected by preceding events, the image quickly loses focus under the influence of a relentless future. Circumstances change with a bewildering rapidity. One such circumstance is the momentum of urban growth.

At this time, in the developing world, in excess of 650 million people live in cities and towns. By the end of the century, that figure will be 1 billion, 600 million. The impact will be greatest in the very largest of the cities. By the year 2000, some 40 cities are projected to exceed 5 million people in size; 18 of those may be larger than 10 million each. One of them, Mexico City, may reach 30 million. A single city with a population greater than all of Canada. All present concepts of 'community' disappear beneath the onslaught of such a concentrated mass of human beings. What of shelter, of water supply and sanitary waste disposal, of transportation? What of human dignity in such circumstances?

These changes will occur notwithstanding that population growth likely peaked in the world in the early 1970s. They represent a growth in the labour force in those countries of some half billion persons

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and a pressure upon urban sites and services of horrendous proportions. The potential for economic and political discord is overwhelming. All of our planning and all of our understanding of the forces at work in this world must anticipate circumstances of this sort.

One should not shy away from such awesome figures, either on the ground that they are too large easily to contemplate or that they are too distant in the future. The danger lies not so much in the fact as in turning away from it. The year 2000 is within the life expectancy of most of us in this room. It is part of our personal futures. We should take little sense of confidence from the knowledge that much more preparatory work was done to land 200,000 men on the beaches of Normandy in two days of June, 1944, than has been done so far in anticipation of the landing on this planet by 1999 of some two billion additional humans.

We should not allow ourselves to be convinced that immediate problems and crises demand the postponement of consideration of issues far in the future. World War II leaders were not content to think only of D-day and its immediate aftermath. As early as August of 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt projected their minds well into the post war period, and well beyond the European Theatre. In the Atlantic Charter, they stated that they hoped to see established a peace "which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

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Thirty-eight years later we have not found the means of attaining either of those freedoms on a global scale. Part of the problem is a physical one - the sheer size of numbers, but part of it, certainly, is lack of will. In an article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Professor Michael Howard, of All Souls College, Oxford University, argues that modern western strategists have forgotten the brilliance of Clausewitz' definition of strategy - his inclusion for the first time of the social dimension. Howard was writing of modern nuclear strategy, but his argument is equally applicable in a broader sense. Without taking adequately into account popular passions and concerns, no plan or proposal is likely to be successful. The passions of the developing countries' billions are acted out daily in representative fashion in the assemblies and councils of the United Nations agencies, yet we in the west fail often to give them the weight they are due. And in so defaulting, we are misinterpreting both the current world environment and our chances of influencing the future.

That future need not be a straight-line projection of current trends. It can be better or it can be worse. The future depends to a large degree on our assessment of the present and on our attitudes to change. Former Prime Minister Trudeau summed it up some time ago. "The challenge of future world social and political events will not be met

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by a stagnant, cautious attitude. We must anticipate, not react; we must think, not conform; we must have courage to discard conventional wisdom in our quest for a secure and peaceful world."

Those of us today who have been given the priceless opportunity to participate in the decision-making process must attempt to construct a statecraft that recognizes and encompasses new actors and new forces on the world stage, that acknowledges the momentous changes of these times, that adjusts to the new economic dependencies.

We must not lose sight of the admonishment of the Yugoslavian leader Djilas who wrote "We are all living in tomorrow's world today, still using yesterday's ideas."

VIII

What are our chances? I began this morning by referring to the 13th Century, its turbulence, confusion and change, and drawing a parallel with the 20th. Would it be of use to us today to read the scorecard of the 14th Century? One historian, de Sismondi, described it as "a period of anguish when there was no sense of an assured future." Yet it was not, we know, the end of civilization. Another historian, Barbara Tuckman, writes: "Violent, destructive, greedy, fallible as he may be, man retains his vision of order and resumes his search."

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This week is the beginning for each of you of a year of search. I envy you the opportunity, and wish you well in your endeavour.